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THE COURTS TAKE FLIGHT: SCIENTER AND THE
MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
For sixty years the federal courts have had a continuing problem
construing the lack of an explicit scienterl requirement in the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).2 The difficulty stems from determining what
degree of intent, if any, the government must prove in order to secure a
conviction for a violation of the MBTA.3 Enacted to give effect to a treaty
between the United States and Britain,' the MBTA was the earliest effec-
tive American animal conservation statute.5 Aimed specifically at protect-
ing certain bird populations from decimation by unrestricted hunting, the
Act provides for federal regulation of hunting methods and seasons.' The
majority of the cases involving the construction of the scienter requirement
The concept of scienter is formulated in various ways. Generally, the term is used to
denote the mental culpability or evil purpose of one acting in violation of the law. Morissette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952). The MODEL PENAL CODE defines the four degrees
of scienter with which a person might act as purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, and negli-
gently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); see MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). At common law, scienter was a necessary element
of a crime. 342 U.S. at 251-52. Certain statutory laws omits intent or scienter as an element
of an offense. Id. at 252-55. In certain cases the courts have construed a statutory omission
of a scienter requirement to mean that a defendant is strictly liable for any violation. See
text accompanying notes 14-15 infra. Thus, the defendant is liable because of the result of
his act. His intent or state of mind is of no bearing in determining his guilt. See text accom-
panying note 15 infra.
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976). The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) specifies that
"[ulnless and except as permitted ... it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in
any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill" protected
migratory birds. Id. at § 703; see text accompanying notes 4-6 infra.
See text accompanying notes 7-10 infra.
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, United States-Great Britain, 39
Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 608 (August 16, 1916). The MBTA was subsequently amended to incorpo-
rate treaties with Mexico, Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mam-
mals, United States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 1912 (February 7, 1936), and Japan,
Convention for the Protection of Birds and Their Environment, United States-Japan, 25
U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990 (March 4, 1972).
, Conservation legislation was not a new concept in 1918 when the MBTA was enacted.
See ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918). As early as 1872 Congress had enacted the Yellowstone
National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-40 (1976) setting aside acreage for a national park.
Congress's prior attempts at developing conservation legislation covering animals, however,
had not been successful. In 1913, Congress attempted to restrict the hunting methods em-
ployed in taking migratory game birds. See Appropriations Act of the Department of Agricul-
ture, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847-48 (1913). This legislation was held invalid as an unpermitted
federal encroachment on powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. United States v. Shauver, 214 F.154, 157 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal
dismissed, 248 U.S. 594 (1919); see U.S. CONsT. amend. X. But in Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the MBTA. The Holland
Court held that the MBTA was a necessary and proper means under Article I, § 8 of the
United States Constitution to give effect to a valid treaty. Id. at 432; see U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8.
16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 704; see note 8 infra.
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of the MBTA are cases 7 concerning hunters who were apprehended while
hunting in or near baited areas in violation of the regulations issued pur-
suant to the MBTA. The defendants in these cases asserted that the
government was required to prove that they were intentionally hunting in
or near baited areas, thus requiring the courts to determine whether scien-
ter was a necessary element of an MBTA violation.9 In two recent cases
the courts applied the MBTA to activities to which the Act had previously
not been applied. 10 In so doing, the courts found little precedential value
in the hunting case decisions and were required to make completely new
constructions of the MBTA's scienter requirements."
In interpreting the MBTA's silence as to scienter, courts are faced with
the fact that scienter, as an element of criminal behavior, is a fundamental
concept of Anglo-American law."2 Thus, absent an express statutory provi-
sion concerning the requisite criminal intent, an initial presumption of
scienter is raised.'3 In certain circumstances, however, the Supreme Court
has found this presumption rebutted when the omission of scienter was
intentional, and necessary and appropriate to protect the public welfare.'4
Where a court finds the presumption of scienter so rebutted, the statute
gives rise to strict liability. However, more than the mere omission of
scienter from the statutory language is required to rebut the presumption
' See, e.g., United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978); Allen v. Mer-
ovka, 382 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky.
1939); see text accompanying notes 21, 49-52 & 62 infra.
I See, e.g., cases cited in note 7 supra; United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. Hunting
Methods, 50 C.F.R. § 20 (1977). The regulations ipecify among other things prohibited
methods of hunting, hunting seasons, times and bag limits. The majority of the cases in which
the question of the scienter requirement of the MBTA is involved arise out of alleged viola-"
tions of hunting methods. Section 20.21(i) prohibits the taking of migratory game birds
"[bly the aid of baiting or on or over any baited area." 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1977). This
section also defines baiting as the artificial use of natural feed grains to lure migratory game
birds. Id. Thus, hunting with the aid of bait would be using feed grains to attract birds into
the area in which one is hunting. Hunting on or over bait would be hunting in the specific
area where one has placed the bait.
See, e.g., cases cited in note 7 supra.
,See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (MBTA violated by
birds deaths resulting from inadvertent waste discharge); United States v. Corbin Farm
Service, 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff'd on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978)
(MBTA violation resulting from misuse of pesticide); text accompanying notes 75-118 infra.
" See text accompanying note 74 infra.
22 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2873 (1978); United States
v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
' United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2873-74 (1978).
" See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (shipment of adulterated food);
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (possession of hand grenades); United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipment of adulterated food); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250 (1922) (sale of narcotics); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922) (sale of
narcotics).
,1 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAFAvE & ScoTr]. Where conviction without fault or scienter is possible under a statute, the
statute is said to impose strict liability. Id.
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of scienter.'6 A court must look at a number of other factors in order to
determine whether the absence of a scienter requirement indicates that
strict liability should be imposed. The factors to be considered are the
legislative history of the act, the severity of the possible punishment, the
magnitude of potential public harm from a violation, the defendant's abil-
ity to acquire knowledge of the true facts, and the number of potential
prosecutions."
These factors were virtually ignored by courts construing the MBTA in
the early hunting cases. 8 In United States v. Schultze'9 and United States
v. Reese,13 the courts were required, for the first time, to consider the
absence of an express scienter requirement in the MBTA. In Schultze, the
defendants were apprehended while hunting in a field which, although not
baited, was in close proximity to a baited area. 2' The facts in Reese are not
set out in the court's opinion. While both courts noted the common law
requirement of scienter,2 they nevertheless interpreted the omission of a
scienter requirement from the MBTA as raising a presumption .of strict
liability.n Thus, while both Schultze and Reese mentioned a presump-
tion of scienter they actually presumed the opposite.24 A majority of the
"United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2873 (1978).
" LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 15, at § 31.
" See text accompanying notes 127-40 infra.
"28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
22 28 F. Supp. at 235.
2 United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 235 (W.D. Ky. 1939); United States v.
Reese, 27 F. Supp. 833, 835 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
2 28 F. Supp. at 235-36; 27 F. Supp. at 835. But see text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
In Schultze, the defendant argued that the government had failed to charge or prove scienter
and that scienter was an essential element of an MBTA violation. The court disposed of this
argument, holding:
In view of the broad wording of the act, and the evident purpose behind the treaty
and the act, this Court is of the opinion that it was not the intention of Congress
to require any guilty knowledge or intent to complete the commission of the offense,
and that accordingly scienter is not necessary.
28 F. Supp. at 236.
Faced with a similar defense argument in Reese, the court stressed the difficulty of proof
of scienter, and held that "[it would seem unreasonable to presume that the omission of a
qualifying scienter to constitute guilt was an inadvertence of the lawmakers. The deduction
is plain that Congress deliberately omitted scienter .... "27 F. Supp. at 835. The focus
thus taken by the courts in Reese and Schultze would seem to be contrary to the presumption
of scienter required by Anglo-American jurisprudence. See text accompanying notes 12-13
supra. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct.
2864 (1978), "[c]ertainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from
the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement." Id. at
2874.
21 The Reese and Schultze courts noted the common law rule of a presumption of scien-
ter. See text accompanying note 22 supra. The courts stated, however, that the common law
rule had been modified where the purpose of the statute would be obstructed by requiring
scienter. 28 F. Supp. at 235; 27 F. Supp. at 835. In stating this modification, the courts relied
on United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). In Balint, the Supreme Court had ruled that
scienter was not a required element of a violation of the Harrison Narcotic Act, ch. 1, § 2, 38
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subsequent decisions interpreting the MBTA have followed the reasoning
of these two cases."
In the early hunting cases, the courts found no clear indication of legis-
lative intent other than the wording of the MBTA, which on its face ap-
peared to impose strict liabilty.6 In 1940, Congress enacted the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA),2 modeling it on the MBTA.28 The
BGEPA specifies as a necessary element for a criminal violation, a scienter
requirement of a knowing act or an act committed with wanton disregard
for its consequences.2 9 The Endangered Species Act (ESA), enacted in
1973,31 also deals with human predation of animals, and specifies a scienter
Stat. 785, 786 (1914). The Harrison Narcotic Act prohibited the sale of narcotics without a
proper prescription and the Balint Court had relied heavily on the statutory language of that
Act as an indication of a congressional intent to eliminate scienter for a violation. 258 U.S.
at 253-54. The Balint Court stated that, where the legislature had intended to eliminate
scienter because scienter would obstruct the purpose of the statute, the common law rule had
been modified. Id. at 251-52. Inasmxich as neither the Reese nor Schultze courts examined
the congressional intent behind the MBTA, they apparently defined the purpose of the
scienter omission to be obtaining conviction of a defendant without proof of intent. As noted
in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), such a literal reading of Balint is inappro-
priate. Id. at 259. The Morissette Court stated that the purpose of every federal statute would
be more easily effectuated by the elimination of scienter. Id. What the courts should focus
on is the peculiar nature and quality of the offense in relation to the public welfare. Id. at
259-60; see text accompanying notes 138-39 infra.
In addition, the Reese and Schultze courts failed to note an important difference in the
statutory language of the MBTA and the Harrison Narcotic Act on which the Balint Court
had based its decision. The Narcotic Act had no provisions for an attempted violation. Under
the MBTA, attempts are violations carrying penalties equal to those of completed offenses.
See note 2 supra. Intent or scienter is generally an essential element of and is required for an
attempt. LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 15, § 59 at 428. Given the fact that a lesser included
offense requiring scienter carries equal penalties under the MBTA, the Reese and Schultze
courts, basing their approach on that of Balint, 'ould have drawn at least an equal if not
greater inference that scienter was a required element of a violation.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 571 F.2d 1, 2 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Jarman, 491 F.2d 764, 766-67 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ireland, 493 F.2d 1208, 1209
(4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ardoin, 431 F. Supp. 493, 495 (W.D. La. 1977); United States
v. Tarmon, 227 F. Supp. 480, 482 (D. Md. 1967).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 243, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918); S. REP. No. 27, 65th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1917); note 2 supra. These congressional reports, which reported the MBTA out of
committee, shed no light on the congressional intent to establish or eliminate a scienter
requirement. But see note 24 supra.
16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976).
United States v. Corbin Farm Services, 444 F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
2 The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976),
prohibits the taking or sale of bald or golden eagles. Id. at § 668. "Taking" under the BGEPA
is defined as pursuing, hunting, shooting, capturing, collecting or killing or attempting to do
those acts. Id. at § 668(c). Whoever knowingly or with wanton disregard for the consequences
of his act takes or kills a protected eagle is subject to maximum criminal penalties of a $5,000
fine or one year of imprisonment, or both. Id. at § 668(a). The Act also has civil penalties
which are punishment by a maximum fine of $5,000 and which do not require any element
of scienter. Id. at 668(b).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
11 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
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requirement of willful action. 2 The ESA is based on the same treaties
which were incorporated into the MBTA subsequent to its enactment.,
The BGEPA is aimed at protecting certain species of eagles from human
destruction,3 and the ESA is designed to similarly protect certain animal
species which are in danger of extinction.? Together with the MBTA, these
acts represent a continuing course of legislation directed toward the protec-
tion of animals from excessive depletion or annihilation. Where there is a
doubtful meaning in a statute, a court may look to the express language
of subsequent statutes dealing with! similar things or relationships in order
to resolve that doubt." In the cases decided subsequent to 1940, the courts
could have looked to the BGEPA and in cases decided since 1973 to both
the BGEPA and ESA to determine congressional policy regarding the re-
quirement of scienter for violations of animal conservation statutes. Yet,
the courts which followed the reasoning of Reese37 and Schultze,38 in decid-
ing hunting cases subsequent to 1940,11 failed to look beyond the MBTA
to later similar legislation for an indication of congressional policy toward
a scienter requirement." Given the prescriptive presumption of scienter,4'
and the lack of evidence of specific legislative intent concerning a scienter
requirement under the MBTA, the courts should have reviewed the more
current legislation to determine congressional policy toward requiring
scienter as a prerequisite to criminal violations of the conservation stat-
utes.12 The BGEPA and ESA manifest a clear intent to create a scienter
requirement for conservation act violations. 3 Thus, by requiring scienter
for the MBTA, the courts would have effectuated the congressional policy
2 The Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), prohibits a large
number of activities, including importing, possessing, selling and taking endangered species.
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). The Secretary of Interior is empowered to designate a species as endan-
gered on the basis of various criteria. Id. at § 1533. Whoever willfully violates the provisions
of the Act is generally subject to maximum criminal penalties of a fine of $10,000 or imprison-
ment for six months, or both. Id. at § 1540(b). The Act also provides for civil sanctions which
require no element of scienter and impose a maximum penalty of $1,000. Id. at § 1540(a).
3 Id. at § 1531(a)(4)(A), (B); see note 4 supra.
" See note 29 supra.
3 See note 32 supra.
3 2A J. SUTHERAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 346 (C. Sands ed. 1943)
[hereinafter cited as SUTmERLAND]. In the MBTA, the omission of a scienter requirement
introduces doubt as to the intent or policy of Congress. The omission of scienter cannot be
construed as indicative of a congressional intent to eliminate scienter as a requirement for a
violation of a statute. See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra. Where the intent of Congress
is unclear, as in the MBTA's scienter requirement, the court may look at subsequent legisla-
tion and transpose the intent found therein to the proper legislation. SUTHERLAND, supra at
346. Such a transposition not only gives effect to the probable intent of the legislature but
also facilitates the establishment of a more uniform and logical system of laws. Id.
17 United States v. Reese, 27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
3 United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
" See note 25 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
11 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
a See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra.
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evidenced in the BGEPA and ESA and would have established a more
uniform and logical system of conservation law."
In decisions subsequent to Reese" and Schultze,46 several courts ap-
proached the scienter question under the MBTA in a different manner
than the earlier two courts, further confusing uniform application of the
MBTA.47 In Allen v. Merovka,45 the Tenth Circuit found that the MBTA
and the regulations issued pursuant to it required scienter for a violation
of the MBTA.4 9 In Merovka, the plaintiff hunters brought an action for
injunctive relief and damages against federal officers. 0 The federal officers
had placed signs on the plaintiffs' property indicating that the property
was situated in a baited area and that hunting was forbidden thereon.,'
The federal officers maintained that they had a right or duty to interefere
with the plaintiffs' efforts to hunt on their own land because the property
was adjacent to a state reserve where feed grains were distributed to attract
migratory game birds." Thus, the government reasoned that anyone hunt-
ing on the plaintiffs' land was hunting with the aid of bait, a method
prohibited by the MBTA.53 Specifically rejecting the rationale of
Schultze,!" the Merovka court noted that both the Act and the regulations
were aimed at restricting hunting methods.55 The court reasoned that for
a hunter to engage in the prohibited method of hunting with the aid of
bait, he necessarily must have some direct or indirect part in placing the
bait." Thus, the Merovka court held that a hunter could not be found to
have violated the MBTA on the basis of the independent, unrelated acts
of others. 7 The Merovka court's construction of the MBTA and the regula-
" See text accompanying note 36 supra.
27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
4' 28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
4 See United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978); Allen v. Merovka,
382 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Bryson, 414 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Del. 1976).
40 382 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967).
4' Id. at 590; see note 8 supra.
382 F.2d at 590.
I d.
52 Id.
53 Id.; see note 8 supra.
-4 382 F.2d at 591. The Merovka opinion notes that the Schultze court had relied on the
court's discretionary ability to adjust the penalty to take care of innocent violations. Id. Thus,
a court could impose a minimal fine for an inadvertent violation. The Merovka court stated
that this was an inappropriate basis for handling such violations. Id.; see text accompanying
notes 125-31 infra. Although the Merovka court never explicitly stated what is the appropriate
means for handling inadvertent violations of the MBTA, the implication of the court's hold-
ing is that inadvertent violations should be dismissed because the defendant lacked scienter.
See text accompanying note 57 infra.
382 F.2d at 591; see note 8 supra.
Id. The Merovka court requires a finding that the defendant actively baited an area
before liability can be imposed. For example, if a hunter placed or requested someone else to
place bait so that it attracted birds over his hunting position, he would be engaging in a
prohibited hunting method. But if the hunter had had no direct or indirect part in placing
the bait, he would not be engaging in a prohibited hunting method in so far as the MBTA
was concerned.
51 Id. Although it is obvious from the case that the Merovka defendants were aware of
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tions issued thereunder as indicating a scienter requirement eliminated the
necessity of having to make an extended analysis beginning with a pre-
sumption of scienter 5
In another recent hunting case dealing with scienter, United States v.
Delahoussaye,59 the Fifth Circuit was unable to find a scienter requirement
to be explicit in the Act and regulations as had the Merovka court."0 Begin-
ning with a presumption that a minimum degree of mental culpability was
required, the Delahoussaye court concluded that a scienter requirement
was an integral element of an MBTA offense. 1 In Delahoussaye, the defen-
dant had been apprehended while hunting within 300 yards of bait and live
decoys." Delahoussaye maintained that the government had to prove that
he knew that the bait and callers were located in the area." The trial court,
however, reasoned that the appropriate scienter requirement was that he
knew or should have known of the baiting.6" Since the defendant had
passed piles of cracked corn on the way to his hunting position, the district
court found that the defendant should have known that he was using a
prohibited hunting method and that the scienter requirement had been
met.65 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with a presumption that scien-
ter is a requisite element of an MBTA violation.6 The court noted that a
defendant's ability to detect possible violations is often limited.67 However,
the court posited that requiring proof of actual knowledge for a violation
would eliminate any incentive for hunters to take reasonably available
precautions to avoid violations." In addition, the circuit court found that
an actual knowledge standard would make enforcement of the regulations
difficult, thereby impairing their effectiveness. 9 The court balanced the
factors of presumption of scienter, the ability of the defendant to acquire
the officials' placing of feed, the court found the regulations were not applicable to them. Id.
At least one other court has followed the Tenth Circuit's approach in Merovka and has come
to the same conclusion that scienter is a required element of an MBTA violation. See United
States v. Bryson, 414 F. Supp. 1068, 1072-73 (D. Del. 1976).
" See text accompanying notes 13 & 16-17 supra.
, 573 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978).
"See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.





" Id. The Delahoussaye court, in the interest of justice, refused to impute an intention
to punish innocent violations of the Act to the MBTA regulations. Id. By implication, the
court refused to impute such an intent to the statute itself. Such a refusal, in the absence of
a clearly expressed congressional intent, would seem to be in accord with the traditions of
Anglo-American jurisprudence requiring a scienter presumption. See text accompanying
notes 12-13 supra.
17 573 F.2d at 912. A defendant might be unable to investigate adjacent areas for bait
because he was prohibited from entering them. Similarly, a defendant might be in a position
over which game birds *ere being attracted by bait located so far away that he reasonably
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knowledge, and the effectiveness of the regulations in holding that a scien-
ter of known or should have known was required under the MBTA.7 0 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that a hunter would be in violation of the Act only
if the prohibited activities could have been discovered by a reasonable
investigation of his hunting area.7'
Thus, in the hunting cases the courts have addressed the scienter re-
quirement for MBTA violations by defendants who were attempting to kill
birds intentionally by illegal methods. The two most recent prosecutions
for violations of the MBTA, however, required the courts to construe the
scienter requirement of the MBTA when applied to unintentional bird kills
resulting from the accidental discharge of toxic waste72 and the negligent
use of pesticide.73 The courts in these cases recognized the limited prece-
dential value of the earlier decisions which construed the MBTA's omis-
sion of a scienter requirement.
7 4
In United States v. FMC Corp.,75 the Second Circuit held that scienter
was not a necessary element of a violation of the MBTA.8 FMC inadver-
tently had released a highly toxic pesticide into its holding pond." A
number of migratory game birds, attracted to the pond, were poisoned by
the pesticide, and FMC was charged with violating the MBTA.7 8 FMC
contended that the government must prove the corporation's intent to
harm the birds as an essential element of the MBTA violation. Never-
theless, FMC was found guilty of a violation of the Act because birds had
been killed by a fortuitous discharge of toxic waste from its plant. 0
In attempting to establish a basis for its determination that scientier
was not a required element of the offense, the court examined the FMC
facts in the light of two different strict liability doctrines, strict criminal
liability for public welfare offense,' and strict liability based on extraha-
70 Id. at 913.
7, Id. at 912; see note 8 supra. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Delahoussaye's conviction. 573
F.2d at 913.
1 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
7 United States v. Corbin Farm Services, 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff'd on other
grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
7' 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978); 444 F. Supp. 510, 533 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
7' 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 908.
Id. at 906.
Is Id. at 905. FMC cooperated fully with the state and federal government agencies in
attempting to determine the cause of the birds' deaths. Id. at 906. In addition, FMC insti-
tuted extensive measures to deter birds from using the pond. Id. at 905-06.
" Id. at 906.
Id. at 908.
" Id. at 906-07; see note 15 supra. The court based its analysis of the FMC facts as a
situation which might be subject to strict liability for public welfare offenses on two cases.
572 F.2d at 906; see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943). Both of these cases dealt with violations of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970). In Dotterweich, the defendant, a corporate presi-
dent, and his corporation, had been charged with shipment of misbranded drugs and adulter-
ated drugs in violation of the FDCA: 320 U.S. at 278; see 21 U.S.C. § 331. In ruling on an
appellate court's reversal of the defendant's jury conviction, the Dotterweich Court held that,
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zardous activity. 2 In reviewing these two doctrines, the court attempted
under the FDCA, a corporate officer could be held vicariously liable for a violation of the
FDCA where the corporation had committed a prohibited act without the officer's active
involvement. Id. at 284-85. The Dotterweich Court based its imposition of vicarious liability
on the fact that, as a responsible corporate officer, the president could be found to be
accountable for the acts of his corporation. Id. at 285. In Park, the defendant, again the
president of a corporation, was charged with a violation of the FDCA because food handled
by the corporation had been stored in unsapitary conditions. 421 U.S. at 660-63. The Park
Court held that the government need not prove that the defendant had taken some wrongful
action as an element of the FDCA violation. Id. at 673. Emphasizing the president's responsi-
ble position in the corporation, the Park Court reasoned that since the defendant had the
power to prevent an FDCA violation this was sufficient to impose liability on him for a
violation. Id. at 674.
The FMC court in relying on Dotterweich and Park, stressed the fact that those two cases
held that an overt act was not necessary for a violation of the FDCA. 572 F.2d 906-07.
Stressing the Park Court's discussion of the defendant's position of responsibility, the FMC
court apparently reasoned that FMC was in a similar position of responsibilty to the extent
that FMC could have prevented the escape of the toxic waste which had killed the birds. Id.
at 907. The FMC court's reliance on Park and Dotterweich resulted from a misinterpretation
of what these decisions held. The Park and Dotterweich Courts were dealing with violations
of the FDCA, a strict liability offense. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922);
United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir. 1943); text accompanying notes 14-
15 supra. Thus, the question in Dotterweich and subsequently in Park was whether the
existent strict liability could be vicariously imposed under the FDCA. The Dotterweich and
Park Courts held that existing strict liability could be vicariously extended to the corporate
officers because of their position of responsibility within the corporation. Thus, reliance on
Dotterweich and Park by the FMC court is inappropriate since the question involved in those
two cases was extension of existing strict liability under the FDCA rather than the initial
imposition of strict liability.
Similarly, the FMC court's reliance is inappropriate because the relationship dealt with
in Dotterweich and Park was that of the officer to the corporation, rather than that of the
officer to the public welfare. The FMC court incorrectly read these decisions as saying that
strict liability could be imposed because of the officers' position of responsibility to the public
welfare.
Aside from the question of the FMC court's interpretation of Dotterweich and Park,
FMC's reliance on those cases is questionable because of other aspects. The FDCA and
MBTA differ radically in purpose. The magnitude of harm which might flow from a violation
of the FDCA is not comparable to that which flows from the MBTA. See text accompanying
notes 138-39 infra. Thus, the rules of interpretation and application developed under the
FDCA would not be applicable to the MBTA.
82 572 F.2d at 907. The FMC court reasoned that the manufacture of toxic pesticide was
an affirmative act, presumably extrahazardous, and that FMC had failed to prevent it from
entering the pond where it had killed the birds. Id. The FMC court found these facts analo-
gous to situations in which strict tort liability might be imposed on a defendant whose
extrahazardous activity causes injury to another. Id. In making this analogy, the court relied
on the strict tort liability doctrines as developed in Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 Hurl. & C 774
(1865), L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), L.R. 2 H.L. (1868) (defendant held strictly liable for water
escaping from his impoundment and damaging the plaintiff's mine), and the RESTEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519(1), (2) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]. 572 F.2d at 907. As the RESTATE mET notes, whether an activity is extrahazar-
dous depends on the consideration of a number of factors including whether the activity
creates a high degree of risk of harm to people or their possessions, whether the potential
magnitude of injury is large, whether reasonable care might not eliminate the risk, whether
the activity is common and appropriate to the area in which it is conducted, and whether it
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to establish the fact that strict liability is a well-accepted concept of Amer-
ican jurisprudence0 Basing its decision specifically on the facts that Con-
gress had stated a public policy of protecting birds and had omitted a
scienter requirement from the MBTA, the FMC court held that because
FMC had allowed the toxic substance to escape into the pond and kill the
birds and would be subjected to relatively minor fines if found to be in
violation of the MBTA, there were sufficient reasons for the imposition of
strict liability. 84 In its construction of strict liability under the MBTA, the
FMC court never considered the presumption of scienter required in the
absence of statutorily mandated scienter. 85 While strict liability is becom-
ing more prevalent in tort law, strict liability in criminal law is still gener-
ally inappropriate. 8 As the Supreme Court recently noted in United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 7 "[c]ertainly far more than the simple
omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is neces-
sary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement." s Consequently, the
FMC court's strict liability ruling can rest only on two of its original three
grounds, the congressional recognition of public policy behind protecting
birds and the fact that FMC would be subject to relatively minor fines. 9
While Congress did intend to protect birds by enacting the MBTA, 0
there is no indication, other than the absence of a scienter requirement in
is of value to the community. RESTATEMENT, supra at § 520. Thus, where the degree of risk
and potential for great injury is high, the activity is abnormal and inappropriate to the locale,
and the activity is of little or no value to the community, the courts are more likely to impose
strict liability regardless of the care exercised by the defendant. Id. See generally W. PRossER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 at 508-14 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
The FMC court's reliance on the strict tort liability doctrine based on extrahazardous
activity is questionable. While criminal law and tort law are related branches of the law, the
purposes of the two are different. LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 15, § 3 at 11. Tort law, with
the exception of punitive damage concepts, is intended only to compensate an injured party
with an emphasis on adjusting conflicting interests to achieve desirable results. PROSSER,
supra § 3 at 15-16. Only in exceptional circumstances is the punitive damage concept of tort
law used to punish the wrongdoer and deter other potential wrongdoers. Id. at 9-10. Alterna-
tively, criminal law is intended to protect the public from harm by punishing harmful con-
duct or acts. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 15, § 3 at 11. The imposition of a fine and a jail
sentence under the MBTA are criminal sanctions serving to deter violations and punish the
violator. These sanctions do not appear intended to serve the purpose of tort law by adjusting
any conflicting interests.
13 572 F.2d at 907. The FMC court's implication that strict liability is an accepted
principal of American jurisprudence is correct where tort law is concerned. PROSSER, supra
note 82, § 75 at 494-96. There is a strong and growing tendency in tort law to create liability
where there has been no fault. Id. at 494. However, as the Supreme Court noted in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978), strict liability is used in criminal
law only in limited circumstances and is generally disfavored. 98 S. Ct. at 2873-74. Thus,
strict liability is the exception rather than the rule in criminal law.
" 572 F.2d at 908.
" See text accompanying notes 13 & 16 supra.
u See note 83 supra.
98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978); see note 83 supra.
u Id. at 2874; see text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
" See text accompanying note 84 supra.
30 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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the MBTA, that Congress intended to accomplish this through the imposi-
tion of strict liability." Indeed, had the FMC court more carefully investi-
gated the history of the MBTA in light of the presumption of scienter, the
FMC court should have found sufficient evidence that Congress intended
scienter to be a requisite element of an MBTA violation."2 The three treat-
ies on which the MBTA is based focus specifically on the intentional deple-
tion of animal populations by unrestricted hunting. 3 Since all the treaties
are concerned primarily with the conservation of animals, the Act arguably
can be extended to cover bird kills which are not the result of hunting.
However, since the treaties on which the Act is based specifically mention
only intentional acts, there is a strong inference that a scienter require-
ment was implicitly intended by those Congresses which enacted the origi-
nal Act and incorporated the subsequent treaties into the Act. 4 This im-
plicit intent, when combined with the presumption of scienter, is an ade-
quate basis for finding that scienter is a necessary element of an MBTA
violation. In addition, although the FMC court stated that there is.a strong
public policy behind the congressional protection of migratory birds, the
court failed to note the equally strong, if not countervailing, congressional
policy of requiring scienter for violations of animal conservation statutes
as evidenced by the BGEPA and ESA." Thus, the congressional policy of
protection on which the FMC court relied is not sufficiently strong to
overcome the policy of requiring scienter. Such a conclusion is based not
only on the fact that the treaties on which the MBTA is based mention
only acts which require scienter," but also on the fact that Congress reaf-
firmed that policy in subsequent legislative enactments. 7
The FMC court's reliance on the relatively inconsequential penalty
which would be imposed on FMC for violating the MBTA is an unnecessar-
ily narrow basis for its decision construing the MBTA to impose strict
liability. In establishing a precedent of strict liability for the MBTA, the
FMC court failed to consider the fact that the possible penalties under the
Act include imprisonment." Since strict liability is generally considered
inappropriate in a statute which includes imprisonment as a possible pen-
alty, consideration of this factor should have influenced the FMC court to
" See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra; note 24 supra.
12 The FMC court stated that the legislativd history was of little help. 572 F.2d at 905;
see text accompanying notes 13, 16 & 17 supra.
11 See Convention for the Protection of Birds and Their Environment, United
States-Japan, art. H, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990 (March 4, 1972); Convention for
the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, United States-Mexico, art II, 50
Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 1912 (February 7, 1936); Convention for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, United States-Great Britain, arts. H-V, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 608 (August 16, 1918);
text accompanying note 4 supra.
"See note 4 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
"See text accompanying note 94 supra.
'7 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
" See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1976). This section provides that for violation of the MBTA,
a maximum fine of $500, or maximum imprisonment for six months, or both can be imposed.
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have required scienter as an element of an MBTA violation.9 While the
fines may be of relatively little consequence to a large corporation, the fine,
coupled with the possibility of a jail sentence with its attendant social
stigma, would not be inconsequential to an individual.'00
In the other recent non-hunting case construing the scienter require-
ment of the MBTA, United States v. Corbin Farm Services,"' a federal
district court, facing circumstances which were somewhat similar to those
confronting the FMC court, found that a degree of scienter was a necessary
element of an MBTA violation.' 2 The Corbin Farm Services defendants
were charged with MBTA violations after a bird kill had resulted from
their misuse of pesticide in violation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)."01 The defendants moved for dismissal of
the MBTA charges on the ground that the Act was inapplicable to uninten-
tional bird kills.' 4 Buttressing their motion with two arguments, the defen-
dants first asserted that since the BGEPA had been modeled on the
MBTA, a violation of the MBTA required a knowing or wantonly negligent
misuse of the pesticide, as does the BGEPA."05 The defendants also argued
that the imposition of strict liability, if extended to its logical limits, could
result in the finding of an MBTA violation by a motorist who accidentally
struck and killed a migratory game bird.'10 Responding to the defendants'
first argument, the court found that the more severe criminal sanctions
and the differing scheme of regulation of the BGEPA indicated that the
MBTA and the BGEPA were not analogous.' 7 The court then observed
" See note 84 supra; text accompanying notes 130-33 infra.
11 See note 132 infra.
RO, 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
102 Id. at 535-36.
103 Id. at 514-15. The defendants in Corbin Farm Services, in addition to the MBTA
charges, were charged with violations of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976). 444 F. Supp. at 514 (E.D. Cal. 1978). The defen-
dants had killed a number of migratory birds by applying pesticide to some fields where the
birds normally fed. Id. at 517. FIFRA makes it unlawful to use any registered pesticide in a
manner inconsistent with its labeling. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(2)(G) (1976). The label had warned
against use on fields where waterfowl were known to repeatedly feed. 444 F. Supp. at 515
(E.D. Cal. 1978). Thus the court found that under FIFRA if the defendants knew or should
have known that the birds fed in the sprayed fields, they were guilty of an unlawful use. Id.
at 519-21. The court noted that it was incumbent on the defendants to use reasonable care
to determine whether birds did regularly feed in the fields. Id. at 521.
'11 Id. at 534.
' Id.; see text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
,o 444 F. Supp. at 535. The government admitted that the defendants had no intent to
kill birds. Id. at 532. They asserted, however, that the MBTA required no awareness of
wrongdoing or intention to violate the law. Id. at 532-33. The defendants had applied the
pesticide and that application had killed the birds. Id. at 533. This, the government main-
tained, was sufficient to find the defendants guilty of an MBTA violation. Id.
'07 Id. at 535; see note 114 infra. In rejecting the defendants' analogy of the BGEPA to
the MBTA, the Corbin Farm Services court partly relied on United States v. Hetzel, 385 F.
Supp. 1311 (W.D. Mo. 1974). See 444 F. Supp. at 535 n.11. Hetzel dealt with the prosecution
of a scout leader who, after finding a dead eagle, had removed its talons for use by his troop
members. 385 F. Supp. at 1320. The government prosecuted Hetzel under the BGEPA for
removal of the talons (see 17 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1976)) and contended that, by analogy to
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that the defendants were not in a position similar to that of the hypothes-
ized motorist.10 The court reasoned that such a motorist would be unable
to foresee and prevent the bird's death while the defendants in the instant
case, through the exercise of reasonable care, could have avoided the
kills.0 9 Thus in spite of the fact that the court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss,"' and in spite of dictum to the contrary," I the Corbin
Farm Services court implied that there is a scienter requirement of reason-
able care in the MBTA.
In Corbin Farm Services, the court, in its analysis of the defendants'
FIFRA violations, emphasized the defendants' ability to acquire knowl-
edge of the facts in establishing a scienter requirement of reasonable
care."' Although the court is not completely clear as to its basis for constru-
ing a similar scienter requirement under the MBTA, the court apparently
relied on the analysis of the scienter requirement it developed with regard
to the FIFRA violations.' 3 Thus, rather than construing the intent require-
ment of the MBTA as an independent piece of legislation, the court in
effect applied the FIFRA requirement to the MBTA. This analysis of the
MBTA's scienter requirement is less than adequate, since a proper analysis
of the MBTA and its relationship to the BGEPA would have led the court
to find that there is a degree of scienter required solely by the MBTA. The
Corbin Farm Services court based its rejection of the BGEPA comparison
on the apparent differences between the two acts in magnitude of penalties
and schemes of regulation."' In dealing with subsequent conservation leg-
the rules of decision developed under the MBTA, no proof of scienter was required. Id. at
1314. Reasoning that the wording of the statute and the congressional intent clearly required
scienter as an element of a BGEPA violation, the Hetzel court rejected the government's
analogy to the MBTA. Id. at 1314-15. Quoting the Hetzel court's rejection of the analogy
between the MBTA and the BGEPA, the Corbin Form Services court without further discus-
sion stated that the MBTA was not analogous to the BGEPA. 444 F. Supp. at 535 n.11.
113 Id. at 535.
,o9 Id. The Corbin Farm Services court noted that the case at bar was not analogous to
that of a motorist who accidentally struck and killed a bird. Id. In the situation confronting
the court, the defendants had violated FIFRA by the misuse of a pesticide. Id.; see note 103
supra. The court pointed out that if the defendants had been unable to prevent the violation
or had acted with reasonable care then a different situation would have been presented. 444
F. Supp. at 536.
' Id.
I The court at one point stated that the killing of the protected birds alone was suffi-
cient to establish a violation. Id.
I" Id. at 535; see note 103 supra; text accompanying note 17 supra.
"1 444 F. Supp. at 535. In addition to developing the reasonable care standard in its
discussion of the MBTA violation, the Corbin Farm Services court stated that the scienter
requirement which it had developed in its analysis of the FIFRA charge was similar to that
of the MBTA. Id. at 535-36; see note 103 supra.
I 444 F. Supp. at 534-35; see text accompanying note 107 supra. The penalty under the
MBTA is a maximum fine of $500, or imprisonment for a maximum of six months, or both.
16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (19%6); see note 98 supra. Under the BGEPA, the criminal penalty is a
maximum of $5,000, or imprisonment for a maximum of one year, or both. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a)
(1976). In addition, the BGEPA provides for civil penalties. 16 U.S.C. § 668(b) (1976) while
the MBTA only has criminal sanctions. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), (b) (1976) with 16
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islation as indicative of congressional policy, the appropriate focus is on
the overall purpose and course of the legislation rather than on the specific
penalties and schemes."15 The Corbin Farm Services court only addressed
the congressional intent evidenced in the treaties which underlie the
MBTA in determining whether the Act was applicable to the poisoning of
birds.I" The court failed to recognize that the treaties themselves indicated
that a scienter requirement was implicit in the MBTA.I" Thus, rather than
relying on the scienter requirement developed for an unrelated statute,
FIFRA, the Corbin Farm Services court should have concluded that a
degree of scienter was required by the MBTA itself. Beginning with a basic
presumption of scienter, the court should have found that a degree of
scienter was required by the MBTA through an appropriate analysis of the
legislative intent evidenced in the treaties on which the MBTA is based,
and the congressional policy indicated in subsequent acts."8
In reviewing the development of the judicial construction of the
MBTA's scienter requirement, the majority of courts failed to start their
analysis with the requisite presumption of scienter."9 Both Reese and
Schultze construed the omission of a scienter requirement to raise a false
presumption of strict liability.'20 Courts following the stare decisis of Reese
and Schultze perpetuated this error.'2 ' In making their construction with-
out the aid of non-hunting precedent, the Corbin Farm Services and FMC
courts also failed to make a presumption that scienter is a requisite ele-
ment of the MBTA. Had those courts deciding post-1940 hunting cases
U.S.C. § 707(a) (1976). The Corbin Farm Services court found these differences to be indica-
tive of a differing scheme of regulation. 444 F. Supp. at 534-35.
"I See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra. Although the Corbin Farm Services court
found the difference between the MBTA's and BGEPA's scheme of regulation and magnitude
of penalties persuasive evidence that the BGEPA's scienter requirement should not be im-
puted to the MBTA, another inference can be drawn from this difference. The BGEPA was
enacted to protect bald and golden eagles which are not only of national symbolic significance
but also are in relatively greater danger of extinction than are the majority of the birds
protected by the MBTA. Thus, the harsher criminal penalties coupled with strict liability
for civil penalties could easily be construed as a congressional determination that violations
of the BGEPA represent a greater harm to the public than a violation of the MBTA. Indeed,
the differing scheme of the BGEPA was the result of the 1972 amendment to that Act. See
Pub. L. No. 92-535, 86 Stat. 1064 (1972). In addition, the 1972 amendment added the scienter
requirement of willful or with wanton disregard for the consequences of one's acts. Id. As the
Senate report noted, the 1972 amendment reflected grave concern over the depletion of the
eagle population. S. REP. No. 92-1159, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972). The Senate noted that
in order to deter violations of the BGEPA, the amendment was designed to increase the
penalties and to reduce the knowledge required for a conviction. Id. at 1. The fact that an
MBTA violation represents a public welfare harm of less magnitude, as indicated by a lighter
congressionally imposed penalty, tends to indicate that scienter should be implied. See text
accompanying note 17 supra; text accompanying notes 138-39 infra.
uS 444 F. Supp. at 532. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
"7 See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 13 & 16 supra.
11 28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky. 1939); 27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939); see text
accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
"I See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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raised the presumption of scienter as required by the Supreme Court' 22 and
then examined subsequent legislation to determine congressional policy,'?-
those courts would have found a congressional intent to require scienter
for violations of animal conservation statutes.2 4 The FMC and Corbin
Farm Services courts also should have looked to the BGEPA and the ESA
to determine congressional policy, as well as examining the treaties under-
lying the MBTA.'1 The wording of those treaties, specifying intentional
acts, raises a strong inference that Congress intended scienter to be implic-
itly required in an MBTA violation.
2 6
Having made a presumption of scienter and examined the history of the
MBTA and subsequent congressional action, the courts should then have
examined several other appropriate factors in order to determine whether
strict liability is appropriate under the MBTA.'2 While a number of the
courts finding an MBTA strict liability requirement did mention the pen-
alties as a factor, the focus of their analsis seems to be inappropriate. Both
Reese and Schuttze stressed the discretionary ability of the trial judge to
adjust the penalty to fit the degree of guilt.' The FMC court focused on
the relative insignificance of the particular penalty as applied to the par-
ticular defendant. 2' The proper focus, however, should be on the potential
severity of the penalty such as possible imprisonment.'0 The penalties for
a violation of the MBTA are a maximum fine of $500, or a maximum of
six months imprisonment, or both.' 1 The expense of a fine at or near the
maximum coupled with a jail sentence is a severe penalty.' 3 Such a pen-
"2 See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 27-44 supra.
"2 See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
"2 See text accompanying notes 34-36 & 93-94 supra.
'M See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
'"7 See text accompanying note 17 supra. One factor which courts consider in determining
whether the legislature intended that strict liability should be applied under a statute omit-
ting any scienter requirement is the number of potential prosecutions under the statute. The
number of potential prosecutions under the MBTA appears to have played no part in any
court's consideration of whether scienter is a required element of an MBTA offense. Given
the large proportion of unreported misdemeanor cases, the number of prosecutions for MBTA
violations is virtually impossible to determine.
12 28 F. Supp. 234, 236; 27 F. Supp. 833, 835; see note 54 supra.
12 572 F.2d at 908; see text accompanying notes 84 & 89 supra.
, Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 72 (1933). Where imprisonment
is a possible penalty under the statute, this potential penalty should weigh heavily against
eliminating a scienter requirement from the violation. Id. The MODEL PENAL CODE takes a
similar position by requiring that a degree of scienter be an element of any offense for which
the penalty includes imprisonment. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, Comment (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955).
' ' 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1976); see notes 98 & 114 supra.
2 In United States v. Green, 571 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1977), the defendant was convicted of
hunting doves over a baited area in violation of the MBTA. Id. at 1. Although there is no
evidence that his offense was particularly egregious, he was fined $450 and sentenced to six
months in jail, with all but 15 days suspended. Id. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972), the Supreme Court recognized that any criminal charge which carried with it a
potential for imprisonment was sufficiently severe to warrant the right to counsel. Id. at 37.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, noted "[t]he consequences of a misdemeanor
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alty would be especially severe if the violation is inadvertent.'3 Thus, the
potential severity of the penalty for an MBTA violation would militate
against strict liability for violations of the Act's provisions.
Another important factor addressed only by the Corbin Farm Services
and Delahoussaye courts is the defendant's ability to acquire knowledge
of the relevant facts enabling him to avoid a violation. 3 To the extent that
a defendant can ascertain information which would allow him to avoid a
violation of the MBTA, courts may tend to decrease the degree of scienter
required.' 3 Thus, as in Delahoussaye and Corbin Farm Services, courts
construing the MBTA's scienter requirement should have decreased the
presumptive scienter of a knowing act only to the extent that the defendant
knew or should have known the relevant facts.'36
None of the courts which found that strict liability was appropriate for
MBTA violations addressed a third important element, the magnitude of
potential harm to the public welfare.' 37 Where substantial harm to the
"public welfare might result from a violation of a statute silent regarding
scienter, courts are less likely to read in such a requirement.' In analyzing
the potential harm to the public welfare of the inadvertent destruction of
a relatively small number of migratory game birds, government sanctioned
destruction by hunting of relatively large numbers of these birds must first
be confronted. The congressional sanction of migratory game bird hunting
raises an inference that Congress has not deemed the destruction of these
birds so adverse to the public welfare that strict liability should be imposed
under the MBTA for inadvertent violations.'39
Given a presumption of scienter,'4" congressional intent and policy as
evidenced by the underlying treaties' and subsequent legislation' indi-
conviction whether they be a brief period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions
found in local jails or the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label 'petty."' Id. at 47-48 (Powell,
J., concurring); see note 130 supra.
'" In United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), and United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a corporate officer might be held vicariously
liable for the strict liability offense of his corporation. 421 U.S. at 677-78; 320 U.S. at 284-85;
see note 81 supra. Thus, given the FMC court's interpretation of the MBTA as a strict
liability statute, a corporate officer could be fined and imprisoned if a mechanical malfunc-
tion allowed a plant's waste to escape resulting in the deaths of migratory birds.
'u See 573 F.2d at 912; 444 F. Supp. at 535; text accompanying notes 67-69 & 112-13
supra.
' See text accompanying note 17 supra.
,3 See text accompanying notes 67, 70-71 & 112 supra.
,31 See text accompanying notes 17 & 125 supra.
'13 See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
,3' See note 115 supra. The public welfare might be considered harmed if large or continu-
ing bird kills resulted from accidental poisoning. Prosecution of this type .of violation, how-
ever, would not be retarded by the requirement of a scienter of reasonable care. In the
continuing kill situation, the government would have little difficulty in proving that the
defendant knew or should have known that his actions were killing birds or that the defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the bird kills. See notes 109 & 112 supra.
,40 See text accompanying notes 13 & 16 supra.
24 See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
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cates a requirement of scienter in the MBTA. The fact that the defendant
can usually apprise himself of the relevant facts, however, indicates that
Congress could have intended to lessen the degree of scienter required.
4 3
Thus, a scienter requirement of reasonable care would satisfy the purposes
of the MBTA, the intent of Congress, and the American judicial concept
of a presumption of scienter.'
M. LANIER WOODRUM
142 See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
"P See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
M" Reasonable care is a minimum form of scienter comparable acting without reckless-
ness or negligence. See note 1 supra..

